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Foreign cash holdings and credit rating: Evidence from U.S. multinationals 
 
ABSTRACT 
Using a sample of listed U.S. multinationals in 1999-2016, we document a positive correlation 
between foreign cash holdings and credit ratings, suggesting that firms may credibly signal their 
liquidity by accumulating large foreign cash reserves and pledging not to repatriate “in the 
foreseeable future”. Also, we find that this positive correlation is stronger in financially 
distressed firms, suggesting that the escalated signaling costs (e.g., an increased penalty in the 
case of cash shortages) in financially distressed firms amplify the signaling effect of foreign cash 
holdings, and thus, strengthen its positive impact on credit rating assessments. These two 
findings hold for an instrumental variable approach, reducing the likelihood of our results being 
purely driven by endogeneity bias. In additional analyses, we find that rating agencies are more 
conservative in discounting the value of foreign cash holdings when multinational firms are at 
the investment-grade cutoff and/or are subject to higher repatriation costs. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Although conventional wisdom suggests that firms with higher cash holdings should be 
“safer”, Acharya, Davydenko, and Strebulaev (2012) provide evidence that risker firms are likely 
to reserve more cash. This puzzlingly positive correlation can be explained by the endogeneity of 
corporate financial and investment policies, in that risky firms tend to accumulate precautionary 
cash reserves to prepare for economic shocks (Acharya et al. 2012). However, the argument of 
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building up precautionary cash reserves cannot explain recent phenomena of U.S. multinational 
firms holding record high levels of cash overseas because liquidity risks are not lessened by 
stockpiles of foreign cash.  
U.S. firms are taxed on their worldwide income, including earnings from foreign 
jurisdictions. To qualify for deferment of tax under the Indefinite Reversal Exception (ASC 740-
30-25-17, formerly APB Opinion 23), U.S. multinationals must assert that foreign earnings are 
indefinitely reinvested abroad and are not expected to be repatriated “in the foreseeable future” 
(ASC 740- 30-25-18(a));1 therefore, many U.S. multinationals designate foreign earnings as 
indefinitely reinvested, but hold in the forms of cash and cash equivalents if foreign investment 
opportunities are limited (Blouin, Krull, and Robinson. 2012; Chen 2015; Krull 2004; Song 
2018). Such a designation helps firms defer tax payments until repatriating foreign earnings; 
however, once designated as indefinitely reinvested, foreign earnings (even in the form of cash) 
cannot be freely transferred to other jurisdictions to fund operations or resolve liquidity needs. 
For example, the 10-K filing of Methode Electronics Inc. in 2018 states, “Of the $246.1 million 
of cash and cash equivalents as of April 28, 2018, $239.3 million was held in subsidiaries outside 
the U.S. Other than specifically identified amounts, foreign earnings continue to be indefinitely 
reinvested outside the U.S. and therefore not available to fund our domestic operations.” 
Therefore, people would naturally expect that, ceteris paribus, firms’ risks of default increase 
with foreign cash holdings because these holdings are less accessible until paying a significant 
amount of repatriation tax (Dhaliwal, Erickson, Goldman, and Krull 2015). However, this 
conjecture might not be true since it overlooks the endogeneity of corporate financial policies. In 
specific, it is also possible that less risky firms do not need to repatriate foreign earnings, 
																																																						
1 If no assertion is made, the U.S. GAAP requires the firm to recognize the expected tax expense on repatriating 
foreign earnings in the current period (Song 2018). 
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resulting in a negative correlation between default risks and foreign cash holdings. Therefore, the 
relation between foreign cash holdings and credit risks is still an empirical question.  
Anecdotal evidence shows that Standard & Poor (S&P) indeed assesses the sources and uses 
of cash when rating nonfinancial corporations,2 while multinational companies are requested to 
disclose foreign cash holdings and discuss any liquidity consequences in the “Liquidity and 
Capital Resources” section in the 10-K filings starting from 2009. Therefore, it is natural to 
conjecture that information concerning foreign cash (such as the amount and usage) disclosed in 
the 10-K should be an important factor in rating agencies’ risk assessment. However, there exists 
a lack of research directly examining this question, and our paper attempts to fill this void by 
examining the empirical relationship between credit ratings and foreign cash holdings for U.S. 
multinationals. 
The corporate credit rating reflects rating agencies’ opinion on an entity’s overall 
creditworthiness and its capacity to satisfy its financial obligations (Standard & Poor’s 2002). In 
general, rating agencies collect and process information to provide independent assessments of 
firms’ credit risks, such as the likelihood of default (Wakeman 1984). At first sight, it appears 
intuitive that foreign cash is less accessible than domestic cash, and thus, reduces domestic 
liquidity and firms’ credit rating (Dhaliwal et al. 2015). However, this argument might be 
misleading because it overlooks the endogeneity of corporate financial policies, such as the 
signaling effects of large cash holdings. Signaling takes root in asymmetric information settings, 
where one party credibly conveys some information about itself to another party through a costly 
signal.3 The notion that firms can signal their ability through large cash reserves is also in line 
																																																						
2 https://www.spratings.com/documents/20184/774196/HowWeRateNonfinancialCorporateEntities_041019.pdf 
3 In Spence (1978)'s job-market signaling model, employees acquire costly education credentials to signal their 
ability. The credential enables the employer to reliably distinguish low ability workers from high ability workers. 
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with empirical evidence in the literature. For example, prior literature finds that firms may 
accumulate cash reserves to signal their fundamentals, investment opportunities, and ability to 
make a commitment (Beatty, Riffe, and Welch 1997; Gentry, Newbold, and Whitford 1985; 
Ghaly, Dang, and Stathopoulos 2015). Similarly, information asymmetry exists between 
multinational firms and credit rating agencies in our setting, and we argue that firms may 
accumulate foreign cash holdings (committing not to repatriate foreign earnings in the 
foreseeable future) to credibly signal their financial health and their ability to meet domestic 
liquidity needs. That is, we hypothesize a positive correlation between foreign cash holdings and 
firms’ credit ratings. 
To sustain a signaling equilibrium, a credible signal must be too costly to be imitated by a 
bad type.4 In other words, the signaling effect of large foreign cash holdings should be more 
reliable when signaling costs are high, such as in financially distressed firms. We use three 
proxies for financial distress, including loss, Altman’s Z-score, and the interest coverage ratio. 
Although loss, Z-score, and the interest coverage ratio do not necessarily predict firms’ 
fundamentals and future performance (because they are calculated based on historical 
performance), it is obvious that, on average, loss-making firms and firms with a lower Z-score or 
interest coverage ratio are closer to a cash shortage, compared with their financially stable 
counterparts. Thus, it is more costly for them to build foreign cash reserves, which in turn 
credibly signals unobservable fundamentals. Therefore, we hypothesize that the positive 
correlation between foreign cash holdings and firms’ credit ratings is more pronounced in 
financially distressed firms. 
																																																						
4 In Spence (1978) 's job-market signaling model, the informational value of education credentials comes from the 
fact that employers believe the credential is positively correlated with the employee’s ability and is difficult for low 
ability employees to obtain. 
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Using a sample of listed U.S. multinational firms from 1999 to 2016, we find a significantly 
positive association between foreign cash holdings and firms’ credit ratings, suggesting that 
credit agencies perceive foreign cash holdings as a positive factor, since it may signal healthy 
fundamentals. The economic impact of foreign cash holdings on credit ratings is also 
meaningful. A one-standard deviation increase in foreign cash holdings would lead to a 0.47-
rating-notch increase in firms’ credit rating. We also perform two robustness tests. First, we use a 
“change regression” to identify whether incremental foreign cash holdings drive changes in a 
company’s credit rating, and we document a significantly positive correlation, suggesting that a 
rating upgrade is more sensitive to larger increases in foreign cash holdings. Second, we use an 
alternative classification scheme to partition credit ratings into an investment grade and a 
speculative grade, and we find that foreign cash holdings are positively associated with the 
likelihood of being classified as investment grade. To summarize, our empirical results support 
our hypothesis of a positive correlation between foreign cash holdings and credit ratings. Our 
further cross-sectional tests find that the abovementioned positive correlation is more 
pronounced in loss-making firms, in firms with a low Altman’s Z-score, and in firms with a low 
interest coverage ratio, suggesting that the escalated signaling costs in these three types of firms 
strengthen the positive impact of foreign cash holdings on credit rating assessments.  
We recognize that potential endogeneity issues, such as omitted variables, reverse causality, 
or simultaneous decisions may arise in our analysis because it is a firm’s choice whether to 
accumulate foreign cash. Thus, we adopt an instrument variable (IV) approach in additional 
analyses, and we confirm that our main conclusions are not affected, thus reducing the likelihood 
of our results being purely driven by endogeneity bias. In additional analyses, we also find that 
the positive association between foreign cash holdings and firms’ credit ratings is weakened 
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when multinational firms are at the investment-grade cutoff and/or are subject to higher 
repatriation costs. Our findings suggest that rating agencies are more conservative in discounting 
the value of foreign cash holdings, when rating agencies have higher reputational concerns in 
assessing credit risks at the investment-grade cutoff, and when foreign cash holdings are located 
in low-tax countries, which are subject to more taxation upon repatriation.  
Our paper relates to Dhaliwal et al. (2015)’s study, which also investigates the empirical 
relation between foreign cash holdings and credit ratings. There are two main differences. First, 
they test hypotheses using a sample from 1993 through 2009, in which firms were generally not 
required to disclose foreign cash holdings. Thus, they must estimate foreign cash holdings, and 
their proxy is subject to some limitations. In contrast, our data on foreign cash holdings are 
directly extracted from the 10-K.5 Second, they argue that less accessible foreign cash reduces 
domestic liquidity and firms’ credit rating, and they document a negative correlation between 
foreign cash holdings and credit ratings. In contrast, we respond to the call by Acharya et al. 
(2012) to take the endogeneity of corporate financial policies into consideration, and we provide 
evidence that foreign cash holdings signal firms’ health, and thus, are positively correlated with 
credit ratings. 
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in the following two ways. First, our paper 
complements the growing literature on foreign cash holdings and tax repatriation. One branch of 
the literature studies agency costs associated with foreign cash holdings, such as less value-
enhancing investments and negative future profitability (e.g., Chen 2015; Hanlon, Lester, and 
Verdi 2015; Song 2018), while another branch of literature examines multinational firms’ 
responses to U.S. tax policy, such as the American Jobs Creation Act (AJCA) of 2004 (e.g., De 
																																																						
5 Details about the method of collecting foreign cash data from the 10-K are discussed in Appendix B. 
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Simone and Lester 2018; De Simone, Piotroski, and Tomy 2018; Dong and Zhao 2018). The main 
conclusion from the abovementioned literature is that high tax-induced foreign cash holdings in 
multinational firms increase agency costs, and thus, result in financing friction. In contrast, our 
paper examines foreign cash holdings from a different perspective by providing evidence that large 
foreign cash reserves can function as a credible signal of firms’ healthy fundamentals, which thus 
improves credit ratings. Moreover, the signaling effect of foreign cash holdings is stronger in 
financially distressed firms in which the signaling costs of pledging not to repatriate cash in the 
foreseeable future are high. Note that our paper does not intend to deny the agency costs associated 
with foreign cash holdings, but we demonstrate the possibility of signaling via foreign cash 
holdings. Our argument is also consistent with anecdotal evidence that, in order to designate 
foreign earnings as indefinitely reinvested, firms must convince their auditors of sufficient 
liquidity to fund domestic operations without the use of foreign earnings (Song 2018), suggesting 
that foreign cash holdings are a valid indicator of sufficient liquidity. 
Second, our paper enriches the literature on credit rating assessments (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife, 
Collins, and LaFond 2006; Attig, Ghoul, Guedhami, and Suh 2013; Bao, Billett, Smith, and Unlu 
2019; Bhojraj and Sengupta 2003; Bonsall, Holzman, and Miller 2016; Cornaggia, Krishnan, and 
Wang 2017; Jiraporn, Jiraporn, Boeprasert, and Chang 2014; Kaplan and Urwitz 1979; Kuang and 
Qin 2013; Lee 2008; Liu and Jiraporn 2010; Molina 2005; Psillaki, Tsolas, and Margaritis 2010; 
Ziebart and Reiter 1992), specifically the relation between firms’ credit ratings and cash holdings 
(Acharya et al. 2012; Dhaliwal et al. 2015). Our paper provides evidence that firms’ credit ratings 
are positively associated with foreign cash holdings, and this positive association is less 
pronounced in firms with higher repatriation costs and in firms at the investment-grade cutoff. Our 
findings suggest that bond analysts generally perceive foreign cash reserves as positively 
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incremental to other performance measures; however, they also become more conservative in 
discounting the value of foreign cash reserves under certain situations. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The second section reviews the literature 
and develops our hypotheses. The third section discusses the research design and data 
description. The fourth section presents the results of testing H1, followed by the results of 
testing H2 in the fifth section. The sixth section reports additional test results. The final section 
concludes. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Credit rating agencies play an important role in debt markets. When issuing debt, firms are 
usually concerned about credit ratings, because debt contracts and interest rates are frequently 
determined by their credit ratings (Graham and Harvey 2001). Given the substantial growth in 
the corporate bond market, it is crucial to understand the factors used in credit risk assessments. 
S&P’s Corporate Rating Framework (2013)6 suggests that the S&P assesses six categories 
in credit risk assessment, including the diversification/portfolio effect, capital structure, financial 
policy, liquidity, management/governance, and comparable rating analysis. Academic research 
has extensively examined the factors in the abovementioned categories. Mansi and Reeb (2002) 
find that diversification in conglomerates enhances bondholders’ value due to a reduction in firm 
risks. Kisgen (2006) finds that concerns about the benefits of upgrades and the costs of 
downgrades directly affect managers' capital structure decisions. Numerous studies show that 
rating agencies consider the impact of financial policy on credit rating, including financial 
reporting quality, accounting conservatism, the book-tax difference, off-balance sheet financing, 





and Stanford-Harris 2002; Attig et al. 2013; Ayers, Laplante, and McGuire 2010; Bao et al. 
2019; Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper 2005; Jiraporn et al. 2014; Kaplan and Urwitz 
1979; Lee 2008; Psillaki et al. 2010; Ziebart and Reiter 1992). Also, recent studies show that 
higher managerial ability and better corporate governance improve credit ratings (Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al. 2006; Bhojraj and Sengupta 2003; Bonsall et al. 2016; Cornaggia et al. 2017; Kuang 
and Qin 2013; Liu and Jiraporn 2010).  
However, compared with the abovementioned categories, liquidity is unique and may be of 
more importance: 
“Liquidity is an important component of credit risk across the entire rating 
spectrum. Unlike most other rating factors within an issuer's risk profile, a lack of 
liquidity could precipitate the default of an otherwise healthy entity. Accordingly, 
liquidity is an independent characteristic of a company, measured on an absolute 
basis, and the assessment is not relative to industry peers or other companies in 
the same rating category. The quantitative analysis of liquidity focuses on the 
monetary flows--the sources and uses of cash--that are the key indicators of a 
company's liquidity cushion.”          -- S&P’s Corporate Rating Framework (2013) 
The relation between firm liquidity and credit ratings has attracted much academic attention. 
However, there exists a lack of research directly examining whether rating agencies assess the 
sources and uses of foreign cash, probably because firms were generally not required to disclose 
foreign cash holdings before 2009. Starting from 2009, the SEC has been sending out comment 
letters to request that multinationals disclose the cash held by their foreign subsidiaries and to 
discuss any liquidity and/or tax consequences (Chen 2015). Since then, data on foreign cash 
holding have become publicly available in the “Liquidity and Capital Resources” section of 10-K 
filings. In line with the S&P’s Corporate Rating Framework (2013), our paper takes an initial 
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step to examine whether information about foreign cash disclosed in the 10-K influences a 
company’s credit rating. 
There is a growing number of studies on foreign cash holdings and tax repatriation. One 
stream studies agency costs associated with foreign cash holdings. For example, Hanlon et al. 
(2015) find that tax-induced foreign investment activities are negatively viewed by the market, 
suggesting that foreign investment activity reflects agency-driven behavior. Chen (2015) finds 
that investors place a discount on foreign cash holdings because they anticipate that foreign cash 
holdings are less accessible, without incurring additional tax costs. Song (2018) finds that excess 
foreign cash holdings are negatively associated with future profitability. Another stream of 
literature examines multinational firms’ responses to U.S. tax policy. Dong and Zhao (2018) find 
that repatriated earnings under the tax holiday (AJCA of 2004) increased firm spending on R&D. 
De Simone et al. (2018) find that, compared with firms that are unlikely to repatriate, firms that 
are likely to repatriate build up foreign cash holdings more, following proposals for a second tax 
holiday. However, the relation between foreign cash holdings and credit risks is unexplored and 
warrantees an empirical investigation. Note that Acharya et al. (2012) urge researchers not to 
overlook the endogeneity of corporate financial and investment policies when examining the 
relation between credit ratings and cash holdings because risker firms are likely to reserve more 
cash. Similarly, we take a different perspective from Dhaliwal et al. (2015) by arguing that a 
firm’s endogenous choice of foreign cash may reveal private information. 
The notion that firms can signal their ability through cash reserves is also in line with 
empirical evidence in the literature. For example, Gentry et al. (1985) find that cash flow patterns 
provide signals about a company's financial health. Beatty et al. (1997) find that firms hold 
unusually high cash positions to signal future investment opportunities. Ghaly et al. (2015) find 
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that firms hold more cash to signal their commitment to better employee welfare provisions. 
Signaling takes root in asymmetric information settings, where one party credibly conveys some 
information about itself to another party through a costly signal. The job-market signaling model 
in Spence (1978)'s seminal paper shows that employees may signal their ability level through 
acquiring costly education credentials, which enables an employer to reliably distinguish low 
ability workers from high ability workers. Similarly, information asymmetry arises between 
multinational firms and credit rating agencies in our setting, and we argue that firms may build 
foreign cash holdings (pledging not to repatriate foreign earnings in the foreseeable future) to 
credibly signal their financial health and their ability to meet domestic liquidity needs. That is, 
we hypothesize a positive correlation between foreign cash holdings and firms’ credit ratings. 
H1. Foreign cash holdings are positively associated with credit ratings. 
To sustain a signaling equilibrium, a credible signal must be too costly to be imitated by a 
bad type. For example, an education credential in Spence (1978) 's job-market signaling model is 
a credible signal because it is difficult for low ability employees to obtain; thus, it is a sustainable 
equilibrium in which employers believe that the credential is positively correlated with an 
employee’s ability. In other words, the key determinant for a signal’s value is the differing cost 
structure between high ability and low ability workers, which helps prevent the bad type from 
mimicking the good type’s behavior. Therefore, the more costly it is for a bad type to mimic a 
good type, the more valuable a signal is. Similarly, we conjecture that the signaling value of large 
foreign cash holdings is higher in financially distressed firms because they are closer to a cash 
shortage and it is more costly for them to accumulate foreign cash reserves, which in turn 
credibly signals unobservable fundamentals. Therefore, we hypothesize that financial distress 
strengthens the positive correlation between foreign cash holdings and firms’ credit ratings. 
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H2. The positive correlation between foreign cash holdings and credit ratings is more 
pronounced in financially distressed firms. 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN AND SAMPLE 
Sample and data  
We collect data on foreign cash holdings from firms’ 10-K filings, and we obtain credit 
rating data and company financial data from Compustat and stock price information from CRSP. 
The final sample includes 2,606 firm-year observations of listed U.S. multinationals from 1999 
to 2016.7 Following prior studies (e.g., Chen 2015), we classify a firm as a multinational if it has 
non-missing pre-tax foreign earnings or current foreign tax expenses. Consistent with relevant 
literature, we use the 12 industry categories proposed by Fama and French and require at least 15 
observations per industry-year grouping. We further exclude firms in utilities and regulated 
industries (SIC codes between 4900 and 4949) and financial services firms (SIC codes between 
6000 and 6999) from our sample. Finally, we winsorize all continuous variables at the bottom 
and top 1 percentiles to mitigate the effects of outliers. 
Following the literature, a firm’s credit rating is a numerical translation of the S&P’s long-
term issuer credit ratings increasing in credit quality (decreasing in credit risk). The ratings range 
from AAA (highest rating) to D (lowest rating—debt in payment default), reflecting the S&P’s 
assessment regarding the creditworthiness of the obligor with respect to its senior debt 
obligations. Following Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006), we collapse the ratings into seven 
																																																						
7 Our sample begins with 1999 because it is the first year in which we have a non-zero sample of foreign cash 
collected from firms’ 10-K filings (see Appendix B for the yearly distribution of data on foreign cash). Our sample 
ends at 2016 because the Compustat S&P Ratings database was discontinued after February 2017.  
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categories (AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B, and others) and transform the ratings into numbers from 
1 to 7 to do the following analyses.8 
Foreign cash data are collected from firms’ 10-K filings. We use Python programming 
language to do a keyword search in all of the 10-K reports for the period 1999-2016 that are 
available from the SEC’s EDGAR database, and then we manually verify the data accuracy. 
Details about the data collection process and the yearly distribution of raw foreign cash data are 
discussed in Appendix B. Two things warrant a brief mention. First, we limit our sample to listed 
U.S. multinationals; thus, multinational firms that choose not to hold any foreign cash will not be 
compared with domestic firms that by definition cannot hold any foreign cash. Second, although 
the SEC has been sending out comment letters request multinationals to disclose the cash held by 
their foreign subsidiaries and to discuss any liquidity and/or tax consequences starting from 2009 
(Chen 2015), the yearly distribution of raw foreign cash data shown in Appendix B suggests that 
many firms did not start until 2011. In other words, if a multinational firm did not disclose any 
foreign cash holdings before 2011, it is difficult to determine whether the missing value is 
because the firm had repatriated all foreign earnings or because the firm was not required to 
disclose such information. Therefore, we delete all firm-year observations with missing foreign 
cash data before 2011, while we assume that the foreign cash holding is zero (insignificant) if a 
multinational firm did not disclose such information after 2011.  
Research design 
To test H1, we examine the relation between a firm’s credit rating and foreign cash holdings 
using the following model: 
																																																						




RATEit = α0 + β1 FCHit + β2 DCHit + β3 SIZEit + β4 ROAit + β5 LOSSit + β6 REit + b7 LEVit  + b8 MBit 
+ b9 INTCOVit  + b10 GROWTHit + b11 CAPINTENit + b12 STDROAit + b13 STDRETit 
+b14 WCAQit + b15 TIMELINESSit + b16 ZSCOREit  + eit                                    (1) 
The dependent variable RATE is firms’ credit rating increasing in credit quality (decreasing 
in credit risk). The independent variable FCH is foreign cash holdings disclosed in the 10-K. As 
is argued in H1, we expect a positive association (β1 > 0) between a firm’s credit rating and 
foreign cash holdings. Following prior studies (e.g., Acharya et al. 2012; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 
2006; Bao et al. 2019), we include control variables that are found to be related to a firm’s credit 
rating. First, we control for domestic cash holdings (DCH). Second, we control for firm 
characteristics: firm size (SIZE), return on assets (ROA), operating loss (LOSS), retained 
earnings (RE), leverage (LEV), market-to-book ratio (MB), interest coverage (INTCOV), sales 
growth (GROWTH), capital intensity (CAPINT), standard deviation of ROA over the prior five 
years (STDROA), standard deviation of stock returns over the prior five years (STDRET), and 
Altman’s Z-score (ZSCORE). Third, we include two measures to capture the transparency of 
firms’ financial reporting: the quality of firms’ working capital accruals (WCAQ) and the 
timeliness of firms’ earnings (TIMELINESS). Finally, we include both industry and year fixed 
effects in the regressions. A detailed definition of all variables is summarized in Appendix A. 
To test H2, we examine the joint effect of foreign cash holdings and financial distress on a 
firm’s credit rating using the following model: 
RATEit = α0 + β1 FCHit + β2 FCHit * DISTRESSEDit + β3 DCHit + β4 SIZEit + β5 ROAit + β6 LOSSit 
+ β7 REit + b8 LEVit  + b9 MBit + b10 INTCOV_NEGit  + b11 GROWTHit                            
+ b12 CAPINTENit + b13 STDROAit + b14 STDRETit + b15 WCAQit + b16 TIMELINESSit     
+ b17 ZSCORE_NEGit  + eit                                                                                    (2) 
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We use three proxies for financial distress, including loss (LOSS), Altman’s Z-score 
(ZSCORE_NEG), and the interest coverage ratio (INTCOV_NEG). For the convenience of 
explaining the results, we multiply negative one with ZSCORE and INTCOV, respectively, to 
derive ZSCORE_NEG and INTCOV_NEG, so that a higher value of DISTRESSED indicates that 
a firm is more financially constrained. As is argued in H2, we expect a positive coefficient (β2 > 
0) for the interaction term FCH * DISTRESSED, suggesting that the positive correlation between 
RATE and FCH is more pronounced in financially distressed firms. 
Descriptive statistics and correlation 
 Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables we use in Models (1) and (2). The 
total number of firm-year observations is 2,606, with an average credit rating of 3.359 implying a 
debt rating in the BB+ and BBB- range. On average, companies have a foreign cash of 0.041 
(equivalent to $420.78 million), a domestic cash of 0.059 (equivalent to $593.77 million), a 
market-to-book ratio of 3.349, a leverage ratio of 0.341, a return of assets ratio of 0.035, a 
retained earnings ratio of 0.114, a growth in sales of 0.059, a size of 8.518 (equivalent to total 
assets of $5 billion), and a capital intensity of 0.536. A total of 20.5 percent of the companies are 
unprofitable. Companies have an average Altman’s Z-score of 2.645, an interest coverage ratio 
of 14.768, working capital accruals of 0.033, and a timeliness of earnings of -0.108. Lastly, the 
means of the companies’ standard deviation of the ROA and stock returns over the prior five 
years are 0.049 and 0.390, respectively.  
 Table 2 provides Pearson correlations for the variables in Models (1) and (2). We find that 
the correlations between each of the firm characteristics and RATE are in the predicted 
directions, consistent with prior literature, and all correlations are statistically significant at the 
0.05 level or better. Specifically, FCH, SIZE, ROA, RE, MB, INTCOV, WCAQ, TIMELINESS, 
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and ZSCORE are positively correlated with credit ratings; whereas DCH, LOSS, LEV, GROWTH, 
CAPINTEN, STDROA, and STDRET are negatively correlated with credit ratings. Further, the 
small correlations between our variable of interest FCH and the control variables suggest that the 
models are unlikely to be subject to multicollinearity. Nonetheless, we check the variance 
inflation factor (VIF) of each variable in all of our tests to quantitatively measure possible 
multicollinearity. The VIF’s are all below 4, which is well below the threshold of 10 suggested 
by Kennedy (2008).  
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Test of H1 
Table 3 reports the multivariate results on the association between a firm’s credit rating and 
foreign cash holdings in Model (1). We find that the coefficient on foreign cash holdings (FCH) 
is positive and statistically significant (β1 = 1.862; p < 0.01), consistent with the prediction of H1, 
indicating that firms with greater foreign cash holdings tend to have better credit ratings. To 
highlight the economic significance of the FCH coefficient estimate, a one-standard deviation 
increase in foreign cash holdings would lead to a 0.47-rating-notch increase in firms’ credit 
rating. This result suggests that credit agencies perceive foreign cash holding as a positive factor, 
since it may signal healthy fundamentals. 
With respect to the control variables, we find that domestic cash holding (DCH) is negative 
and significantly associated with credit ratings, which suggests that credit agencies perceive 
domestic cash holding as a negative signal for firms’ healthy fundamentals. This finding is 
consistent with Acharya et al. (2012)’s argument that risker firms are likely to reserve more 
(domestic) cash. Consistent with prior literature (e.g., Acharya et al. 2012; Ashbaugh-Skaife et 
al. 2006; Bao et al. 2019), firm size (SIZE), retained earnings (RE), interest coverage (INTCOV), 
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Altman’s Z-score (ZSCORE), and the transparency of firms’ financial reporting (i.e., measured 
as WCAQ and TIMELINESS) are positively and significantly associated with credit ratings; while 
loss (LOSS), the leverage ratio (LEV), sales growth (GROWTH), and the standard deviation of 
stock returns (STDRET) are negatively and significantly related to credit ratings. 
Change analysis 
In order to further identify whether incremental foreign cash holdings drive changes in a 
company’s credit rating, we use a “change regression” as follows:  
ΔRATEit = α0 + β1 (ΔFCHit) + β2 (ΔDCHit) + β3 (ΔSIZEit) + β4 (ΔROAit) + β5 (ΔLOSSit)                
+ β6 (ΔREit) + b7 (ΔLEVit ) + b8 (ΔMBit ) + b9 (ΔINTCOVit ) + b10 (ΔGROWTHit )       
+ b11 (ΔCAPINTENit ) + b12 (ΔSTDROAit ) + b13 (ΔSTDRETit ) + b14 (ΔWCAQit )         
+ b15 (ΔTIMELINESSit ) + b16 (ΔZSCOREit)  + eit                                                    (3)                     
Table 4 reports the results in Model (3) using ΔRATE as the dependent variable, where 
ΔRATE is the change in credit ratings from year t-1 to t. The independent variable, ΔFCH, and all 
control variables are measured as the change variables from year t-1 to t, respectively. We find 
that the coefficient on ΔFCH is positive and statistically significant (β1 = 4.660; p < 0.01), 
suggesting that an increase in incremental foreign cash holdings leads to higher incremental 
credit ratings. This result further demonstrates the positive relation between firms’ foreign cash 
holdings and credit ratings. In addition, we find that an increase in firm size (SIZE) or retained 
earnings (RE) is positively related to an upgrade in ratings, whereas an increase in the leverage 
ratio (LEV) is related to a downgrade.    
Investment grade vs. speculative grade  
Following Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006), we use an alternative classification scheme to 
partition credit ratings into an investment grade and a speculative grade so as to overcome the 
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difficulty in quantifying the marginal effects of changes in foreign cash holdings on credit ratings 
with multiple categories. Thus, we re-examine H1, Model (1), using INVESTGRADE as the 
dependent variable, where INVESTGRADE is coded as one if the firm’s credit rating is BBB- or 
better, and zero otherwise.  
Table 5 reports the results. We find that the coefficient on foreign cash holdings (FCH) is 
positive and statistically significant (β1 = 3.423; p < 0.05), suggesting that foreign cash holdings 
are positively associated with the likelihood of being classified as investment grade. The 
remaining results are similar to the results in Table 3, and we also find that INVESTGRADE is 
positively correlated to ROA (p < 0.01) and negatively correlated to STDROA (p < 0.01).  
V. TEST OF H2 
Table 6 reports the results on the joint effect of foreign cash holdings and financial distress 
on a firm’s credit rating in Model (2). Columns (1), (2), and (3) present the regression results 
with ZSCORE_NEG, INTCOV_NEG, and LOSS, respectively, as proxies for financial distress 
(DISTRESSED). Consistent with the prediction of H2, we find that the coefficients for each 
interaction term FCH * DISTRESSED are positive and statistically significant (p < 0.01 in 
Columns 1 and 2, and p < 0.05 in Column 3), meaning that the positive correlation between 
foreign cash holdings and credit ratings is more pronounced in loss-making firms, in firms with a 
low Altman’s Z-score, and in firms with a low interest coverage ratio. These results suggest that 
the escalated signaling costs in these three types of distressed firms strengthen the positive 
impact of foreign cash holdings on credit rating assessments. The coefficients on foreign cash 
holdings (FCH) in all three columns are positive and statistically significant (p < 0.01), 
consistent with the prediction of H1 that firms with greater foreign cash holdings tend to have 
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better credit ratings. The coefficients on the control variables are similar to those reported in 
Table 3.  
VI. ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
Endogeneity 
A potential concern for the research design is endogeneity. First, the relationship between 
foreign cash holdings and credit ratings may be subject to an omitted variable problem. Second, 
it is possible that a reverse causality story could explain our results. For example, firms with high 
credit ratings may have more access to the debt market, and thus, are likely able to hold more 
cash overseas. Third, simultaneity bias may arise if the foreign cash holdings and credit ratings 
are codetermined, with each affecting the other. Following prior literature (Dharmapala, Foley, 
and Forbes 2011; Dong and Zhao 2018; Larcker and Rusticus 2010), we adopt the two-stage-
least-squares (2SLS) approach with an exogenous instrumental variable (IV) to mitigate 
endogeneity issues. Empirically, a good instrument should be strongly correlated with the 
endogenous variable FCH, but should be uncorrelated with the error term, and thus, posts no 
direct impact on the dependent variable RATE. Following Dharmapala et al. (2011) and Dong 
and Zhao (2018), we use TAXHAVEN as IV in this study: on one hand, TAXHAVEN affects FCH 
because multinationals are likely to take advantage of the reduced tax rate in tax haven 
jurisdictions, and thus, increase foreign cash holdings; on the other hand, there is no obvious 
reason to expect that TAXHAVEN would affect RATE in ways other than through its impact on 
FCH. Next, we re-evaluate H1 and H2 with the 2SLS regressions. 
Table 7 reports the results for the 2SLS. The regressions include the same control variables 
as those shown in Table 3, as well as industry and year fixed effects. Column (1) presents the 
results for the first stage. As expected, we find that the coefficient for TAXHAVEN is 
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significantly positive (β1 = 0.001; p < 0.01), implying that firms with more subsidiaries located in 
tax haven jurisdictions are more likely to have a greater amount of foreign cash holdings. In the 
second stage, we use the estimated FCH obtained from the first stage. The second-stage result 
for H1 is presented in Column (2), and the second-stage results for H2 are reported in Columns 
(3) - (5). In Column (2), the coefficient for FCH is significantly positive (p < 0.01), consistent 
with the prediction of H1, suggesting that the positive correlation between foreign cash holding 
and credit rating is robust to endogeneity concerns. In Columns (3) - (5), the coefficients for the 
interaction term FCH*DISTRESSED are significantly positive (p < 0.01 in Columns (3) and (5), 
and p < 0.05 in Column (4)), consistent with the prediction of H2, supporting our hypothesis that 
financial distress strengthens the signaling effect of foreign cash holding.  
Tax repatriation costs 
Both tax rules and financial reporting rules provide firms with incentives to defer 
repatriation, and thus, hold a substantial amount of unremitted foreign earnings in the form of 
cash; however, foreign cash holdings cannot be deployed by U.S. parent companies without 
incurring repatriation taxes (Bryant-Kutcher, Eiler, and Guenther 2008; Chen 2015; Edwards, 
Kravet, and Wilson 2016; Hanlon et al. 2015). Therefore, in the case of domestic cash shortages 
(i.e., when a firm must repatriate), the higher the repatriation costs are, the more repatriation 
taxes the firm must pay. Thus, we conjecture that rating agencies discount the value of the 
foreign cash holdings of firms with high repatriation costs, and we examine whether the potential 
repatriation costs on foreign source income affect the correlation between firms’ credit ratings 
and foreign cash holdings using the following regression model: 
RATEit = α0 + β1 FCHit + β2 FCHit * REPCOSTit + β3 REPCOSTit+ β4 DCHit + β5 SIZEit                 
+ β6 ROAit + β7 LOSSit + β8 REit + b9 LEVit  + b10 MBit + b11 INTCOV_NEGit                    
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+ b12 GROWTHit + b13 CAPINTENit + b14 STDROAit + b15 STDRETit + b16 WCAQit         
+ b17 TIMELINESSit  + b18 ZSCORE_NEGit  + eit                                            (4)                                                                   
Table 6 reports the results of Model (4). REPCOST is a continuous variable measuring the 
repatriation tax costs. Following Foley, Hartzell, Titman, and Twite (2007), we estimate 
repatriation costs in two measures: REPCOST_1 and REPCOST_2	(see Appendix A for the 
definition and calculation). Our focus is the coefficient β2 for the interaction term FCH * 
REPCOST. We predict a significantly negative correlation, suggesting that the higher 
repatriation costs weaken the positive correlation between foreign cash holdings and credit 
ratings. Consistent with our prediction, we find that the coefficients on the interaction term FCH 
* REPCOST are negative and statistically significant (p < 0.01 in Column 1 and p < 0.05 in 
Column 2). Also, we find that the coefficients on foreign cash holdings (FCH) are positive and 
statistically significant in both Column 1 (β1 = 2.214; p < 0.01) and Column 2 (β1 = 2.268; p < 
0.01). These results suggest that rating agencies are more conservative in discounting the value 
of foreign cash holdings when these holdings are located in low-tax countries and are subject to 
more taxation upon repatriation. The coefficients for the control variables are similar to those 
reported in Table 3.  
One additional element deserves subtler consideration. At first sight, it sounds natural that 
higher repatriation costs may strengthen the signaling effect of foreign cash holding because 
repatriation costs discount the value of foreign cash holdings that can potentially be used to meet 
domestic liquidity, which may convey firms’ confidence in their financial condition. However, 
this argument is misleading because it overlooks the fact that firms will not pay more than what 
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they pay if they repatriate now.9 In other words, compared with firms having low repatriation 
costs, there is no additional cost (other than the repatriation taxes that they are supposed to pay) 
associated with holding a great amount of foreign cash; thus, high repatriation costs do not 
increase the penalty for a bad-type firm holding foreign cash to mimic a good-type firm. Thus, 
we do not observe repatriation costs strengthening the signaling effect of foreign cash holdings. 
In contrast, the financial distress that we discussed in H2 significantly increases the penalty of a 
bad-type firm mimicking a good-type firm because financially distressed firms suffer more if 
they experience cash shortages or liquidity shocks. Thus, the escalated signaling costs in 
financially distressed firms strengthen the positive correlation between foreign cash holding and 
credit rating. 
Reputational concerns 
We next explore whether the positive correlation between foreign cash holdings and credit 
ratings is affected by rating agencies’ reputation concerns when they assess bonds at the 
threshold of an investment grade. The investment-grade cutoff is particularly important because 
certain investors have the restriction of investing only in investment-grade bonds (Kraft 2015). 
For the S&P’s long-term issuer credit ratings, the company must be rated as BBB- or better, in 
order to be considered as investment grade. Thus, we follow Kraft (2015) in considering BBB- 
as the investment-grade cutoff.  
Naturally, all bond issuers desire investment-grade ratings to obtain a large investor base. 
However, rating agencies are likely more conservative at the investment-grade cutoff because of 
reputational concerns; reputation is rating agencies’ primary asset, which serves as the basis for 
their long-term business prospects (Klein and Leffler 1981; Shapiro 1983; Kraft 2015). 
																																																						
9 If they anticipate a tax holiday in the near future, they will pay less; otherwise, they will pay the same amount of 
repatriation tax as of today. 
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Therefore, we predict that rating agencies discount the value of foreign cash holdings more at the 
investment-grade cutoff, and we examine whether reputational concerns weaken the positive 
correlation between credit ratings and foreign cash holdings using the following regression 
model: 
RATEit = α0 + β1 FCHit + β2 FCHit * THRESHOLDit + β3 THRESHOLDit+ β4 DCHit + β5 SIZEit                 
+ β6 ROAit + β7 LOSSit + β8 REit + b9 LEVit  + b10 MBit + b11 INTCOV_NEGit                    
+ b12 GROWTHit + b13 CAPINTENit + b14 STDROAit + b15 STDRETit + b16 WCAQit         
+ b17 TIMELINESSit  + b18 ZSCORE_NEGit  + eit                                            (5)                                                                   
Table 9 reports the results in Model (5). THRESHOLD is an indicator variable for firms’ 
credit ratings of BBB-. Our focus is the coefficient β2 for the interaction term FCH * 
THRESHOLD. We predict a significantly negative correlation, suggesting that reputational 
concerns at the investment-grade cutoff weaken the positive correlation between foreign cash 
holdings and credit ratings. Consistent with our prediction, we find that the coefficient for the 
interaction term FCH * THRESHOLD is negative and statistically significant (β2 = -2.594; p < 
0.05). Also, we find that the coefficient on foreign cash holdings (FCH) is significantly positive 
(β1 = 2.259; p < 0.01), consistent with the prediction of H1. One additional element warrants 
brief mention. When THRESHOLD is present, the coefficient on FCH is negative (i.e., β1 + β2 = 
-0.335), but not significantly different from zero (z = -0.26; p = 0.793). This finding indicates 
that the positive association between foreign cash holdings and credit ratings has been weakened 
to a level that is not distinguishable from zero, suggesting that rating agencies are conservative in 





This paper examines whether credit rating agencies consider foreign cash holdings when 
assessing an entity’s overall creditworthiness and its capacity to meet its financial obligations. 
We find that foreign cash holding is positively associated with credit rating, suggesting that 
credit agencies positively perceive foreign cash holding, which may credibly signal firms’ 
fundamentals. Also, we find that the positive correlation is much stronger in finally distressed 
firms, suggesting that the escalated signaling costs in financially distressed firms strengthen the 
positive impact of foreign cash holdings on credit rating assessments. In further analyses, we 
show that our results continue to hold for an instrumental variable approach, reducing the 
likelihood of our results being purely driven by selection bias issues or omitted variables. We 
also find that the positive association between foreign cash holdings and firms’ credit ratings is 
weakened when multinational firms are at the investment-grade cutoff and/or are subject to 
higher repatriation costs, implying that rating agencies are more conservative in discounting the 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 
RATE 2,606 3.359 1.073 3.000 3.000 4.000 
FCH 2,606 0.041 0.362 0.000 0.000 0.028 
DCH 2,606 0.059 0.074 0.015 0.047 0.095 
SIZE 2,606 8.518 1.287 7.611 8.374 9.361 
ROA 2,606 0.035 0.079 0.011 0.043 0.075 
LOSS 2,606 0.205 0.403 0.000 0.000 0.000 
RE 2,606 0.114 0.465 -0.050 0.173 0.378 
LEV 2,606 0.341 0.186 0.208 0.313 0.445 
MB 2,606 3.349 8.013 1.404 2.378 3.970 
INTCOV 2,606 14.768 21.402 5.252 9.088 15.512 
GROWTH 2,606 0.059 0.201 -0.029 0.037 0.114 
CAPINTEN 2,606 0.536 0.399 0.219 0.422 0.792 
STDROA 2,606 0.049 0.063 0.015 0.028 0.055 
STDRET 2,606 0.390 0.311 0.195 0.306 0.466 
WCAQ 2,606 0.033 0.039 0.015 0.035 0.054 
TIMELINESS 2,606 -0.108 0.193 -0.114 -0.037 -0.008 
ZSCORE 2,606 2.645 1.845 1.526 2.483 3.565 




Table 2. Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
 
Variables  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q 
RATE A 1.00                 
FCH B 0.26 1.00                
DCH C -0.18 -0.50 1.00               
SIZE D 0.63 0.16 -0.17 1.00              
ROA E 0.43 0.20 -0.04 0.21 1.00             
LOSS F -0.36 -0.13 0.04 -0.20 -0.70 1.00            
RE G 0.52 0.11 -0.03 0.24 0.46 -0.41 1.00           
LEV H -0.41 -0.16 0.00 -0.22 -0.24 0.25 -0.41 1.00          
MB I 0.10 0.00 0.04 0.06 0.10 -0.07 0.09 -0.01 1.00         
INTCOV J 0.41 0.24 -0.07 0.19 0.35 -0.22 0.30 -0.44 0.05 1.00        
GROWTH K -0.10 -0.03 -0.00 -0.04 0.13 -0.09 -0.01 0.05 0.05 0.03 1.00       
CAPINTEN L -0.15 -0.20 0.019 -0.07 -0.20 0.17 -0.15 0.17 -0.06 -0.12 -0.16 1.00      
STDROA M -0.32 -0.05 0.10 -0.24 -0.31 0.28 -0.42 0.18 -0.06 -0.12 0.01 0.13 1.00     
STDRET N -0.40 -0.08 0.09 -0.28 -0.18 0.18 -0.32 0.14 -0.02 -0.14 0.08 0.16 0.35 1.00    
WCAQ O 0.16 0.09 0.01 0.12 0.06 -0.02 0.08 -0.05 0.05 0.08 -0.18 0.08 -0.03 -0.10 1.00   
TIMELINESS P 0.31 0.06 -0.03 0.20 0.28 -0.28 0.25 -0.18 0.02 0.11 -0.01 -0.18 -0.22 -0.35 -0.01 1.00  
ZSCORE Q 0.50 0.22 0.01 0.11 0.63 -0.44 0.68 -0.49 0.15 0.50 0.04 -0.23 -0.28 -0.22 0.12 0.23 1.00 
 
Table 2 presents the Pearson correlation matrix. The bold numbers are significant at the 5% level or better.  
See Appendix A for variable definitions.  
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Table 3. Regression analysis, H1 

































Year fixed effects Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes 
N 2,606 
Pseudo R2  0.3818 
Table 3 presents the results from the estimation of the following ordered probit model: 
RATE=β0 + β1 * FCH+ βi *Controls + ε   
See Appendix A for variable definitions. The values in parentheses are z-values.   
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 4. Change regression for H1 

































Year fixed effects Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes 
N 1,269 
Pseudo R2  0.0745 
Table 4 presents the results from the estimation of the following change model: 
ΔRATE=β0 + β1 * ΔFCH+ βi *ΔControls + ε   
See Appendix A for variable definitions. The values in parentheses are z-values.   
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 5. Investment grade vs. speculative grade analysis 

































Year fixed effects Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes 
N 2,606 
Pseudo R2  0.5306 
Table 5 presents the results from the estimation of the following logit model: 
INVESTGRADE=β0 + β1 * FCH+ βi *Controls + ε   
See Appendix A for variable definitions. The values in parentheses are z-values.   
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 6. Regression analysis, H2 
Variables (1) ZSCORE_NEG (2) INTCOV_NEG (3) LOSS 
FCH 4.439*** 0.3858*** 1.591*** 
 (5.49) (4.35) (2.66) 
FCH * DISTRESSED 0.667*** 0.044*** 4.468** 
 (4.63) (5.49) (2.35) 
DCH -1.553*** -1.946*** -0.974*** 
 (-5.61) (-6.38) (-4.00) 
SIZE 0.726*** 0.728*** 0.720*** 
 (29.23) (29.25) (29.09) 
ROA 0.324 0.438 0.507 
 (0.60) (0.81) (0.94) 
LOSS -0.274*** -0.277*** -0.354*** 
 (-3.11) (-3.15) (-3.82) 
RE 0.615*** 0.601*** 0.625*** 
 (7.47) (7.30) (7.61) 
LEV -0.573*** -0.600*** -0.606*** 
 (-3.30) (-3.45) (-3.49) 
MB 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (1.41) (1.51) (1.37) 
INTCOV_NEG -0.008*** -0.01*** -0.007*** 
 (-6.52) (-7.83) (-6.20) 
GROWTH -0.905*** -0.924*** -0.891*** 
 (-6.72) (-6.86) (-6.63) 
CAPINTEN -0.035 -0.043 -0.041 
 (-0.48) (-0.59) (-0.57) 
STDROA -0.315 -0.266 -0.372 
 (-0.70) (-0.59) (-0.83) 
STDRET -0.814*** -0.813*** -0.818*** 
 (-9.09) (-9.09) (-9.16) 
WCAQ 2.304*** 2.370*** 2.176*** 
 (3.75) (3.86) (3.55) 
TIMELINESS 0.600*** 0.597*** 0.623*** 
 (4.26) (4.24) (4.44) 
ZSCORE_NEG -0.270*** -0.242*** -0.228*** 
 (-9.96) (-9.43) (-8.95) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 2,606 2,606 2,606 
Pseudo R2  0.3846 0.3858 0.3825 
Table 6 presents the results from the estimation of the following ordered probit model: 
RATE=β0 + β1 * FCH +β2 * FCH * DISTRESSED +β3 * DISTRESSED + βi *Controls + ε   
See Appendix A for variable definitions. The values in parentheses are z-values.   
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7. Instrumental Variable 
 Stage 1 Stage 2: Test H1 Stage 2: Test H2 
Variables (1) (2) (3) ZSCORE_NEG (4) INTCOV_NEG (5) LOSS 
FCH  13.040*** 14.392*** 13.769*** 12.837*** 
  (4.96) (5.74) (5.38) (4.79) 
FCH * DISTRESSED   0.504*** 0.042** 3.799** 
   (2.95) (2.37) (2.42) 
DCH  -1.326*** -1.513*** -1.450*** -1.377*** 
  (-3.44) (-3.64) (-3.57) (-3.50) 
TAXHAVEN 0.001***     
 (3.63)     
SIZE 0.004*** 0.440*** 0.464*** 0.452*** 0.441*** 
 (4.15) (3.55) (3.68) (3.62) (3.56) 
ROA 0.081*** -0.390 -0.495 -0.420 -0.385 
 (3.15) (-0.62) (-0.80) (-0.67) (-0.61) 
LOSS -0.001 -0.169* -0.169* -0.172* -0.228** 
 (-0.15) (-1.88) (-1.88) (-1.91) (-2.33) 
RE -0.004 0.493*** 0.507*** 0.490*** 0.495*** 
 (-1.14) (4.41) (4.53) (4.44) (4.41) 
LEV 0.011 -0.659*** -0.636*** -0.677*** -0.641*** 
 (1.38) (-3.70) (-3.62) (-3.78) (-3.62) 
MB -0.0003** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 (-2.10) (2.74) (2.73) (2.73) (2.68) 
INTCOV_NEG -0.0002*** -0.003 -0.003* -0.004* -0.003 
 (-3.53) (1.55) (-1.74) (-1.90) (-1.59) 
GROWTH -0.019*** -0.385* -.409* -0.398* -0.380* 
 (-3.11) (-1.67) (-1.75) (-1.72) (-1.66) 
CAPINTEN -0.015*** 0.168* 0.163* 0.169* 0.163* 
 (-4.52) (1.90) (1.80) (1.89) (1.83) 
STDROA 0.049** -0.963** -0.951** -0.956** -0.960** 
 (2.33) (-2.24) (-2.18) (-2.21) (-2.23) 
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STDRET 0.004 -0.613*** -0.631*** -0.627*** -0.615*** 
 (1.10) (-4.56) (-4.70) (-4.64) (-4.57) 
WCAQ 0.036 1.225* 1.339* 1.263* 1.233* 
 (1.25) (1.65) (1.77) (1.69) (1.66) 
TIMELINESS -0.009 0.617*** 0.616*** 0.616*** 0.612*** 
 (-1.48) (4.00) (4.04) (4.02) (3.99) 
ZSCORE_NEG -0.005*** -0.090* -0.126** -0.100* -0.091* 
 (-4.68) (1.63) (-2.03) (1.76) (-1.65) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2,585 2,585 2,585 2,585 2,585 
Adj.  R2 0.2234     
Pseudo R2   0.3850 0.3872 0.3861 0.3861 
 
Table 7 presents estimates of the instrumental variables methods using two-stage least squares (2SLS) panel regressions.  
In Stage 1, we regress FCH on TAXHAVEN and the controls in Column (1); t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  
In Stage 2, we use estimated FCH from Stage 1 to test H1 in Column (2), and test H2 in Column (3)-(5); z-values are reported in 
parentheses.  
See Appendix A for variable definitions.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8. Repatriation costs 
Variables	 (1) REPCOST_1	 (2) REPCOST_2	
FCH	 2.214***	 2.268***	
	 (2.85)	 (2.74)	





 (-4.43) (-4.30) 
SIZE 0.755*** 0.755*** 
 (25.27) (25.31) 
ROA 0.302 0.482 
 (0.43) (0.69) 
LOSS -0.138 -0.131 
 (-1.25) (-1.18) 
RE 0.807*** 0.790*** 
 (7.68) (7.53) 
LEV -0.702*** -0.710*** 
 (-3.19) (-3.23) 
MB 0.008** 0.008** 
 (2.26) (2.11) 
INTCOV 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 (5.76) (5.73) 
GROWTH -0.897*** -0.894*** 
 (-5.01) (-5.00) 
CAPINTEN -0.168* -0.174** 
 (-1.90) (-1.97) 
STDROA -1.471** -1.395** 
 (-2.13) (-2.02) 
STDRET -0.861*** -0.869*** 
 (-7.54) (-7.61) 
WCAQ 1.813** 1.836** 
 (2.45) (2.48) 
TIMELINESS 0.661*** 0.660*** 
 (3.49) (3.49) 
ZSCORE 0.214*** 0.211*** 
 (6.79) (6.74) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
N 1,865 1,865 
Pseudo R2  0.3808 0.3810 
Table 8 presents the results from the estimation of the following ordered probit model: 
RATE=β0 + β1 * FCH +β2 * FCH * REPCOST +β3 * REPCOST + βi *Controls + ε   
See Appendix A for variable definitions. The values in parentheses are z-values.   
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Year fixed effects Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes 
N 2,606 
Pseudo R2  0.3846 
Table 9 presents the results from the estimation of the following ordered probit model: 
RATE=β0 + β1 * FCH +β2 * FCH * THRESHOLD +β3 * THRESHOLD + βi *Controls + ε   
See Appendix A for variable definitions. The values in parentheses are z-values.   
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 	
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
 
Variables Definitions 
CAPINTEN Capital intensity, measured as gross PPE divided by total assets. 
ΔCAPINTEN Change in CAPINTEN from year t-1 to year t.  
DCH Domestic cash, measured as ln[(Total cash-foreign cash)/total assets +1]. 
ΔDCH Change in DCH from year t-1 to year t.  
FCH Foreign cash (from 10-K), measured as ln(foreign cash/total assets+1).  
ΔFCH Change in FCH from year t-1 to year t.  
GROWTH Sales growth, calculated as a percentage change in sales.  
ΔGROWTH Change in GROWTH from year t-1 to year t.  
INTCOV Interest coverage, measured as operating income before depreciation and interest expense divided by interest expense.  
ΔINTCOV Change in INTCOV from year t-1 to year t.  
INTCOV_NEG Negative one times INTCOV.  
INVESTGRADE An indicator variable that equals 1 if firm credit ratings (RATE) is BBB- or better, and 0 otherwise.  
LEV Leverage, measured as total debt divided by total assets.  
ΔLEV Change in LEV from year t-1 to year t.  
LOSS An indicator variable that equals 1 if net income before extraordinary items is negative, and 0 otherwise. 
ΔLOSS Change in LOSS from year t-1 to year t.  
MB Market-to-book ratio, measured as the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity.  
ΔMB Change in MB from year t-1 to year t.  
RATE Long-term issuer credit ratings compiled by Standard & Poor’s.  
RE Retained earnings divided by total assets.  
ΔRE Change in RE from year t-1 to year t.  
REPCOST_1 
Repatriation Cost, measured as (pre-tax income * marginal tax rate -current 
foreign income tax expense)*100/|pre-tax income|, where the marginal tax 
rate is developed and provided by Professor John Graham 
(http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~jgraham/).  
REPCOST_2 Similar to REPCOST_1, but using the U.S. corporate statutory tax rate instead of the marginal tax rate.  
ROA Return on assets, measured as net income before extraordinary items divided by total assets.  
ΔROA Change in ROA from year t-1 to year t.  
SIZE Firm size, measured as the natural logarithm of total assets.  
ΔSIZE Change in SIZE from year t-1 to year t.  
STDRET Standard deviation of daily stock returns over the past five years. 
ΔSTDRET Change in STDRET from year t-1 to year t.  
STDROA Standard deviation of ROAs over the past five years. 
ΔSTDROA Change in STDROA from year t-1 to year t.  
TAXHAVEN The number of tax haven jurisdictions in which firms have foreign subsidiaries (from Exhibit-21 of the 10-K). 
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THRESHOLD An indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm’s credit rating (RATE) is BBB-, and 0 otherwise. 
TIMELINESS 
Negative one times the squared residual from the following regression 
RET=b0+b1(NIBX)+b2(LOSS)+b3(NIBX*LOSS)+b4(ΔNIBX)+ ε, where the 
regression is estimated by three-, two-, or one-digit SIC codes conditional on 
having at least 10 firms in each SIC group.  
RET=the market-adjusted return over the fiscal year; NIBE=net income 
before extraordinary items scaled by the beginning of the period market value 
of equity; LOSS=one if NIBE is negative, and zero otherwise; DNIBE=the 
change in net income before extraordinary items scaled by the beginning of 
the period market value of equity.  
ΔTIMELINESS Change in TIMELINESS from year t-1 to year t.  
WCAQ 
Negative one times the standard deviation of the firm-specific residual 
from the prior 3-5 years, where residuals are from the following 
cross-sectional estimation of Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) model: 
WCAt=β0+β1CFOt-1+β2 CFOt+β3CFOt+1+ε, where regressions are estimated 
by three-, two-, or one-digit SIC codes conditional on having at least 10 firms 
in each SIC group. 
Working Capital Accruals (WCA)=(change in current assets−change in 
cash−change in current liabilities+change in debt in current liabilities 
+change in income taxes payable)/average total assets; CFO=cash flow from 
operations/average total assets.  
ΔWCAQ Change in WCAQ from year t-1 to year t.  
ZSCORE Altman’s (1968) Z-score: 3.3(EBIT/total assets)+1.0(sales/ total assets) +1.2(working capital/ total assets)+0.6(market value equity/total debt).  
ΔZSCORE Change in ZSCORE from year t-1 to year t.  




Appendix B: Data collection for foreign cash holdings and tax havens 
Foreign cash holdings: 
We perform the following procedures. First, we use Python programming language to 
conduct a keyword search in all of the 10-K reports for the period 1999-2016 that are available 
from the SEC’s EDGAR database. We create three lists of keywords based on Chen (2015) and 
patterns summarized from a pilot sample of 10-K filings.  
The first list of keywords: “held”, “held by”, “held outside”, “held in”, “held at”, “had”, 
“owned”, “located”, and “attribute”.  
The second list of keywords: “foreign subsidiar”, “international subsidiar”, “foreign institution”, 
“international institution”, “outside the U.S.”, “outside the United States”, “outside of the U.S.”, 
“outside of the United States”, and “non-U.S.”, “foreign”, “international”, and “oversea”.  
The third list of keywords: “cash equivalents”, “short-term investment”, “marketable securities”, 
“cash and investment”, “cash”, and “cash balance”.  
Our Python algorithm searches for sentences that have at least one word from each of the 
abovementioned three lists, and then collects the number of foreign cash holdings in the 
sentence, and also records the whole sentence for our manual verification. 
Second, we manually read the recorded sentences to verify the data accuracy. If errors are 
found, we manually collect the correct number of foreign cash holdings from the 10-K. Note that 
in most cases, firms disclose this information under “MD&A – liquidity and capital resources” 
(Chen 2015); thus, our manual check focuses on this section. Finally, we sort our foreign cash 
data to detect missing firm-year observations of firms that have at least one non-zero 
observation, and we manually read those firms’ 10-K filings in years with missing observations 
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to verify whether firms disclose this information. In total, we collected 3,355 non-zero samples, 
and the yearly distribution is shown below. 
Table A1: Distribution of raw foreign cash data by year 
Fiscal year Frequency Percent 
1999 1 0.03 
2000 1 0.03 
2001 2 0.06 
2002 14 0.42 
2003 23 0.69 
2004 37 1.1 
2005 44 1.31 
2006 46 1.37 
2007 55 1.64 
2008 69 2.06 
2009 79 2.35 
2010 116 3.46 
2011 315 9.39 
2012 438 13.06 
2013 491 14.63 
2014 537 16.01 
2015 543 16.18 
2016 544 16.21 
Total 3,355 100 
It is clear that although the SEC requests that multinationals disclose foreign cash starting 2009, 
many firms did not start until 2011 and 2012. Therefore, we delete all firm-year observations 
with missing foreign cash data before 2011, while we assume foreign cash holdings of zero if a 
multinational firm does not disclose such information after 2011. The sample of foreign cash 
(including zeros) is distributed as follows: 
Table A2: Yearly distribution of foreign cash data, including zeros 
Fiscal year Frequency Percent 
1999 1 0.01 
2000 1 0.01 
2001 2 0.02 
2002 14 0.13 
2003 23 0.22 
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2004 37 0.35 
2005 44 0.42 
2006 46 0.43 
2007 55 0.52 
2008 69 0.65 
2009 79 0.75 
2010 116 1.1 
2011 1,646 15.56 
2012 1,647 15.57 
2013 1,672 15.8 
2014 1,690 15.97 
2015 1,741 16.46 
2016 1,697 16.04 
Total 10,580 100 
After merging with credit rating data and financial data, our final sample includes 2,606 firm-
year observations. 
Tax haven: 
Tax haven data is collected from Exhibit-21 of 10-K, in which firms disclose the name and 
location of their subsidiaries. We use Python programming language to conduct a keyword 
search in Exhibit-21 of each firm’s 10-K, and we count the number of tax haven jurisdictions in 
which firms have subsidiaries.  
Tax haven jurisdictions are defined by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD 2000 list) and CORPNET report in 2017, including the followings: 
Andorra, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, 
British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Cyprus, Dominica, Gibraltar, Grenada, 
Guernsey, Hong Kong, Ireland, Isle of Man, Jersey, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Macao, 
Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Monaco, Montserrat, Nauru, The Netherlands 
Antilles, Niue, Panama, Samoa, San Marino, Seychelles, Singapore, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and 
Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Switzerland, Tonga, Turks and Caicos, U.S. Virgin 
Islands, and Vanuatu. 
